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Two Telegram Android RCE Exploits Bypass New Defenses

Mobile Security & Exploit Analysis

Telegram Android Widget RCE Bypasses Explained: NebuSec Seccomp Research vs. Live Risk

Two Telegram Android RCE Exploits Bypass New Defenses

Verification Date: November 18, 2026  |  Affected Build Tested: Telegram for Android 13.2.2 (7303)  |  Component: QuickJS Widget Sandbox & Seccomp Filter

I reviewed the latest Telegram Android security reports after claims circulated about two new Remote Code Execution (RCE) exploits bypassing the app's defenses [1]. A lot of unverified summaries online confused these flaws with older file-preview bugs or routine HackerOne bug bounty patches. The verified technical reality is much more specific.

Security researchers at NebuSec demonstrated two exploits that bypass the new security filter Telegram added to its Android app in mid-November 2026 [1]. The flaws target Telegram's interactive chat widgets. In a video demonstration running on Telegram for Android version 13.2.2 (7303), a bot widget bypassed the new filter and launched the phone's built-in Calculator app [1].

The researchers ran their test on a Telegram test server [1]. Telegram currently blocks ordinary bots from sending widgets on the live production network. Only approved bots on a server-side allowlist can send them right now [1].

Fact-Check: Separating Rumors from Verified Evidence

I checked the primary disclosures to clear up three common mix-ups circulating in recent blog posts:

  • Widget RCE vs. File/Link Bugs: The mid-November 2026 bypasses hit the QuickJS widget engine and its Linux seccomp filter, not thumbnail generators or deep-link handlers [1].
  • Patch Status: NebuSec's write-up lists no fixed version beyond 13.2.2 (7303). Instead, live users rely on Telegram's server-side bot restriction to block unapproved widgets [1].
  • Voice Call RCE Was Separate: On October 29, 2026, NebuSec disclosed a different RCE in Telegram's voice-call library (Signaling.cpp) affecting Android versions 8.6.2 to 12.10.3. Telegram patched that bug in version 12.10.4 [4].

How the Widget Exploits Slipped Past the New Defenses

Telegram CEO Pavel Durov announced the chat widgets feature on November 10, 2026 [2]. Widgets are small interactive blocks that bots send inside chat messages. Their JavaScript code runs directly on your phone using a lightweight engine called QuickJS [1].

One day after launch, researchers at security firm V12 posted a video showing a bot message opening the Calculator app on an Android phone [2], [3]. V12 followed up with a second video showing code execution on the Telegram Windows client, pointing out that QuickJS processed message scripts without a sandbox [2].

Telegram updated its Android client to lock down the widget engine. I checked the details from the published source code for Telegram for Android 13.2.2 (7303) [1]. The developers made two key changes. First, they moved QuickJS into its own separate process on Android. Second, they added a Linux seccomp (secure computing mode) filter to restrict the system calls that the widget process can make [1].

I noticed a big catch in that source code. The seccomp filter was configured in audit mode [1]. In audit mode, the filter blocks direct attempts to start new programs or processes, and it merely logs other listed system calls while letting them run. A developer comment in the code stated they would leave it in audit mode until device logs proved the engine never needed those calls [1]. NebuSec found two ways to bypass that filter and execute code outside the widget restriction [1].

Telegram Android 13.2.2 Widget Execution Flow and NebuSec Bypass Three-stage diagram showing the server delivery gate, the isolated QuickJS process with a seccomp filter in audit mode, and the NebuSec bypass launching the Android Calculator app on a test server. Conceptual Architecture: Telegram Android 13.2.2 (7303) Widget Filter & Bypass 1. Server Delivery Gate Prod Server: Allowlist Only (General bots blocked) Test Server: Widget Sent 2. Isolated QuickJS Process Executes Widget JavaScript Separate Android Process Seccomp: Audit Mode 3. NebuSec Filter Bypass 2 Bypasses Evade Seccomp Spawns External Activity Launches Android Calculator Verified Security Boundaries & Evidence Limits: • Production Containment: Ordinary bots cannot send widgets on live servers (telegram-bot-api allowlist). • Audit-Mode Behavior: Blocks direct process creation but logs other listed syscalls while allowing execution. • Binary Caveat: Published 13.2.2 source shows audit mode; live Play Store binary config is unconfirmed. • Post-Exploit Scope: Demo popped Calculator; access to chat databases or tokens was not disclosed.
Figure 1: Illustrative conceptual diagram of the Telegram for Android 13.2.2 (7303) widget execution flow and the NebuSec test-server bypass [1].

Comparing the Late-2026 Telegram RCE Disclosures

Three distinct code-execution stories hit Telegram within a three-week window. I built the table below to keep the affected versions, vectors, and current statuses straight.

Disclosure & Date Target Component Affected Versions Exploitation Status Mitigation / Fix
NebuSec Widget Filter Bypasses (Nov 17–18, 2026) [1] QuickJS widget process & Linux seccomp filter Telegram for Android 13.2.2 (7303) PoC demonstrated on Telegram test server (opens Calculator) Server-side bot allowlist blocks general bots on live service; no newer client build listed yet
V12 Widget Demos & WebRAT Alert (Nov 11–16, 2026) [2], [3] Unsandboxed QuickJS chat widgets (Android & Windows) Pre-13.2.2 Android builds & Windows desktop client PoC videos published; Kaspersky reported suspected in-the-wild WebRAT malware delivery Telegram deployed Nov 11 server/client fixes & restricted widget bot permissions
NebuSec Voice Call RCE (Oct 29, 2026) [4] Signaling.cpp malformed MediaState call packet Telegram for Android 8.6.2 through 12.10.3 (ARM64) Vulnerability disclosed with PoC upon answering a call; no CVE assigned Patched in Telegram for Android 12.10.4 (released late September 2026)

What This Actually Means for Your Phone

People panic when they read "Remote Code Execution" in a headline. They assume a stranger can take over their phone just by knowing their phone number. These widget flaws don't work like that.

Pavel Durov stated in a channel post that no one could be hacked just by receiving a message, noting that an attack required a user to start a third-party service first [1], [2]. A contributor to the telegram-bot-api repository on GitHub also confirmed late last week that general bots aren't allowed to use widgets even in private chats [1]. Because ordinary bots are blocked from sending widgets on live production servers, NebuSec had to use a Telegram test server to demonstrate their bypass [1].

You still shouldn't ignore the warning. Before Telegram locked down widget permissions, Kaspersky warned that threat actors may have exploited widget flaws in the wild when users visited certain Telegram channels, delivering the Rust-based WebRAT malware via PowerShell scripts [1], [2]. Kaspersky advised users not to launch widgets in Telegram until a full fix rolls out [2].

Timeline of Telegram Android RCE Disclosures (Oct–Nov 2026) Chronological sequence from October 29 voice call RCE disclosure through November 10 widget launch, November 11-13 V12 demos and 13.2.2 update, November 16 Kaspersky warning, and November 17-18 NebuSec bypasses. Timeline of Telegram RCE Disclosures & Defenses (Oct–Nov 2026) Oct 29 Voice Call RCE (Fixed in 12.10.4) Nov 10 Widgets Launch QuickJS in chats Nov 11–13 V12 RCE Demos 13.2.2 adds seccomp Nov 16 Kaspersky Alert Suspected WebRAT Nov 17–18 NebuSec 2 Bypasses Test server demo
Figure 2: Sequence of verified Telegram code-execution disclosures and defensive updates across October and November 2026 [1], [2], [4].

What Remains Unknown

Good security analysis requires separating what researchers proved from what remains undisclosed. Based on The Hacker News and SecurityWeek reporting, three technical details are still unconfirmed [1], [2]:

  1. Post-Exploitation Reach: NebuSec's write-up and X demonstration show the widget opening the Android Calculator app. They do not state what else the code could access, such as saved chat messages, account tokens, or the broader phone file system [1].
  2. Production Binary Filter Mode: While the published source code for version 13.2.2 (7303) shows the seccomp filter in audit mode, the code alone does not confirm whether the compiled binary users install from Google Play uses that exact setting [1].
  3. Allowlist Scope: Telegram has not published the list of approved bots still permitted to send widgets on the live network or stated when the restriction on general bots will end [1].

Steps to Lock Down Your Android Setup

You can take four practical steps right now to reduce your attack surface across both the recent widget bugs and earlier media/call vulnerabilities.

1. Update Telegram Immediately

Open Google Play and install the latest build (at least 13.2.2 or newer). Updating also ensures you have the 12.10.4 patch that blocks the October voice-call RCE [1], [4].

2. Do Not Launch Untrusted Widgets or Bots

Follow Kaspersky's guidance: avoid interacting with interactive chat widgets or sending /start to unverified third-party bots until strict client-side sandboxing is verified [2], [3].

3. Restrict Voice Calls & Auto-Downloads

In Settings > Privacy and Security > Calls, restrict who can call you to "My Contacts" or "Nobody." In Settings > Data and Storage, disable automatic media downloads for unknown chats.

4. Audit Active Sessions

Check Settings > Devices and terminate any active session you don't recognize. If you use crypto wallets on the same phone, keep high-value funds off mobile hot wallets.

Why Defensive Updates Often Need a Second Pass

Security headlines often treat every patch bypass like a complete collapse. Real-world software engineering is messier. Shipping an embedded JavaScript engine like QuickJS inside a messaging app creates a large attack surface [2].

When developers rush out a new process isolation layer and put a seccomp filter into audit mode to avoid breaking legitimate devices, independent researchers will test those exact boundaries [1]. Server-side restrictions—like blocking ordinary bots from sending widgets—buy engineers time to turn audit logs into strict enforcement rules before opening the feature back up to everyone.

Common Questions About the Telegram Flaws

Can an attacker trigger the NebuSec widget bypass on my phone right now through a random bot?
Not on Telegram's live production servers, according to current evidence. General bots are barred from sending widgets on the live service, which is why NebuSec ran its demonstration on a Telegram test server [1].

Did the widget vulnerabilities affect only Android?
No. While NebuSec's two seccomp bypasses targeted Telegram for Android 13.2.2 (7303), V12 also demonstrated widget RCE on the Telegram Windows desktop client, and Kaspersky warned of Windows PowerShell payloads delivering WebRAT [1], [2].

Have CVE identifiers or CISA KEV entries been assigned to these November 2026 widget flaws?
No CVE identifiers have been assigned to either the V12 widget RCE or the NebuSec 13.2.2 seccomp bypasses as of November 18, 2026, and neither appears in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog [1], [3].

NK

Cybersecurity Researcher & Technical Editor

UnpanicTech publishes independent cybersecurity research and defensive security analysis. Naseem Khan serves as Technical Editor, with a focus on vulnerability analysis, defensive security, incident response, cloud security, and practical security engineering.

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