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Password Spraying vs Brute Force vs Credential Stuffing

What Is the Difference Between Password Spraying, Brute Force and Credential Stuffing?

Password Spraying vs Brute Force vs Credential Stuffing

Brute force hammers one account with many passwords. Password spraying tries one common password against many accounts. Credential stuffing replays username and password pairs that leaked from another site. The difference is what the attacker already knows, and it decides which of your defenses can even see the attack.

Lockout rules were built for the first one. Spraying is designed to slip under them [1]. This guide separates the three, shows what each looks like in your logs, and ties the fixes to phishing-resistant MFA, our BEC response playbook and the wider identity security guide.

Three password attacks drawn as grids Three five by five grids where rows are accounts and columns are password guesses. Brute force fills one row. Password spraying fills one column. Credential stuffing fills the diagonal, one pair per account. Rows are accounts. Columns are passwords. Filled squares are guesses. Brute forceMany passwords, one accountPassword sprayingOne password, many accountsCredential stuffingOne leaked pair per account
Figure 1. The three attacks as guess patterns on the same grid. Conceptual diagram. Source: UnpanicTech original.

Key Takeaways

  • Brute force goes deep on one account. Spraying goes wide across many accounts.
  • Credential stuffing replays leaked pairs, so password reuse is the weakness.
  • MITRE files all three under Brute Force (T1110), yet your logs treat them very differently.
  • Per-account lockout catches brute force and often misses a spray.
  • Blocklists beat complexity rules against spraying, and MFA is still the strongest single fix.
  • Found one? Our guide to investigating compromised M365 and Entra ID accounts covers what to check next.

MITRE ATT&CK files all three attacks under Brute Force (T1110), then splits them into Password Guessing (T1110.001), Password Spraying (T1110.003) and Credential Stuffing (T1110.004) [2] [1] [2]. OWASP draws the same lines in its prevention cheat sheet: brute force tests many passwords against one account, stuffing tests pairs from another site's breach, and spraying tests one weak password against many accounts [3].

That classification explains why the terms get mixed up. Spraying and stuffing are technically kinds of brute force, yet each breaks a different assumption in a sign-in system.

MITRE says spraying uses one password or a short list of common ones to avoid the lockouts that guessing on a single account would cause [1]. Credential stuffing depends on people reusing passwords across personal and business accounts [2]. A defense that expects one attacker hammering one account sees neither.

How Do Password Spraying, Brute Force and Credential Stuffing Differ?

Brute force tries many passwords against one account. Password spraying tries one common password, or a short list, against many accounts. Credential stuffing tries username and password pairs that leaked from another site. The three differ in what the attacker knows beforehand: nothing, a list of accounts, or real credentials. That difference decides how many failures any single account records.

Definition: password spraying

Password spraying is a guessing attack that tries one password, or a short list of common ones, against many different accounts. Attackers choose it because it avoids the lockouts that many guesses on one account would trigger. MITRE ATT&CK tracks it as T1110.003, a sub-technique of Brute Force [1].

The table below compares password guessing, password spraying and credential stuffing by starting knowledge and pattern.

AttackMITRE IDWhat the attacker starts withGuess pattern
Password guessing (classic brute force)T1110.001No known credentials, maybe a list of common passwords [2]Many passwords, one account
Password sprayingT1110.003Many accounts and one common password [1]One password, many accounts
Credential stuffingT1110.004Credentials from breaches of unrelated sites [2]Leaked pairs, tried against target accounts

A quick note on words. MITRE uses Brute Force as the parent technique and lists the other three beneath it [1] [2].

OWASP uses "brute force" for the single-account version only [3]. So when someone says brute force, ask which one they mean.

Say it in one line each

  • Brute force goes deep on one account. Password spraying goes wide on many.
  • Credential stuffing doesn't guess. It replays passwords people already chose somewhere else.
  • A lockout counter that watches accounts one at a time will never see a spray.

Why Doesn't Account Lockout Stop Password Spraying?

Account lockout counts failures one account at a time, and a spray never gives any single account enough failures to trigger it. The attacker spreads one password across many accounts, so each account sees a failure or two. Lockout still works well against brute force on one account. It just watches the wrong dimension for a spray.

MITRE describes the point of spraying plainly: try one password, or a short list, across many accounts to avoid the lockouts that come from hammering a single account [1]. Each account sees a failure or two. Nothing trips.

Attackers also slow down on purpose. MITRE says adversaries may throttle spraying to avoid triggering security alerts [1].

Strict lockouts carry a cost of their own. MITRE warns that a policy that's too strict can lock out every account an attacker touches, which turns into a denial of service for your own users [1].

The chart below compares brute force and password spraying against a per-account lockout threshold, using illustrative numbers.

Failed attempts per account, brute force against password spraying One tall bar for a single account hits an example lockout threshold of 10 failures. Eight short bars, one failure each, show a spray that never reaches the threshold on any account. Failed attempts per account Illustrative numbers, not measured data Example lockout threshold: 1010Brute forceone account1 failure eachPassword sprayingeight accounts
Figure 2. Why a per-account counter sees brute force and misses a spray. Illustrative numbers. Source: UnpanicTech original.

Microsoft Entra smart lockout works around the problem by tracking where a sign-in comes from. It keeps separate lockout counters for familiar and unfamiliar locations, so an attacker can be locked out while the genuine user keeps working [4]. By default it locks an account after 10 failed attempts in Azure Public tenants, and the lockout period starts at one minute and grows with repeated failures [4].

Smart lockout also tracks the last three bad password hashes, so repeating the same wrong password leaves the counter alone [4]. Hash tracking is unavailable with pass-through authentication, because authentication happens on-premises [4].

In hybrid setups, Microsoft says the on-premises AD DS lockout threshold should be at least two or three times the Entra threshold, so Entra filters the attack before it reaches AD DS [4]. Even so, Microsoft says smart lockout doesn't guarantee a genuine user is never locked out [4].

One more detail from Microsoft: when Entra blocks a sign-in on its own anomaly analysis, it returns AADSTS50053 regardless of whether the password was valid [4]. In our reading, a lockout error by itself can't tell you whether a guess was right.

What Does Each Attack Look Like in Your Logs?

Brute force shows as many failures on one account. Spraying shows as a few failures each across many accounts, all from related sources in the same window. Stuffing shows as many distinct username and password pairs, often spread over many source addresses. Your logs only reveal a spray if you group failures across accounts, not within one account.

MITRE's detection strategy for password spraying describes a high volume of authentication failures using a single password, or a small set, across many accounts within a time window [1]. Most sign-in logs don't record the attempted password. In practice, the evidence is indirect: many accounts failing in the same window, often from related sources.

The table below shows how password guessing, password spraying and credential stuffing differ in sign-in logs, based on MITRE's detection analytics.

AttackWhat you'd seeWhere it hides
Password guessingRepeated failures, such as Event ID 4625, aimed at the same or similar accounts, or failed SSH logins followed by a success [2]Hard to hide at 300 attempts an hour, since per-account counters catch it
Password sprayingFailures across many accounts from the same IP address, or dozens of SSO or SaaS accounts failing with one password [1]Throttled pacing, and LDAP or Kerberos attempts that rarely create 4625 [1]
Credential stuffingDistinct username and password pairs from one IP address or session [2]Proxy networks that keep per-IP volume low [3]

Windows adds a catch. MITRE notes that LDAP and Kerberos attempts are less likely than SMB attempts to produce Windows event ID 4625 [1] [2]. In our view, a spray hunt should also read the identity provider logs, not only member servers.

Credential stuffing has its own wrinkle. Toolkits can spread requests across many source addresses, so per-IP volume stays low even in a big attack [3]. OWASP suggests correlating sign-in traffic with proxy and hosting provider address intelligence [3].

The chart below shows reported pacing for password guessing and password spraying from MITRE's procedure examples, on a log scale [1] [2].

Reported pacing of guessing attacks on a log scale Three bars on a log scale: over 300 attempts an hour per account in brute-force mode, about 4 an hour in spray mode, and one attempt per 24 hours in a throttled spray. Reported pacing, per targeted account Brute-force mode (APT28 tooling): over 300 an hourSpray mode (APT28 tooling): about 4 an hourThrottled spray (Quad7): 1 attempt per 24 hours0.1110100Attempts per hour per account (log scale)
Figure 3. Pacing examples from MITRE ATT&CK, drawn on a log scale. Each bar is one reported example, not an average. Source: UnpanicTech original chart.

APT28 tooling ran in two modes: over 300 attempts an hour per account in brute-force mode, and about four an hour per account in spray mode, over days or weeks [2] [1]. Quad7 activity went further, with a single sign-in attempt per account in 24 hours [1]. A per-account threshold can catch the loud mode and never see the quiet one.

For rule formats, see our Sigma and YARA rules page.

Which Defenses Stop Which Attack?

No single control stops all three, so layer them. MFA is the strongest one, because a correct password alone no longer opens the account. Blocklists and leaked password checks starve spraying and stuffing of usable passwords. Lockout and rate limits handle brute force best. Cross-account monitoring is what exposes a spray.

The table below rates common defenses against password guessing, password spraying and credential stuffing. The ratings are our assessment of the cited guidance.

DefenseBrute forceSprayingStuffingBasis
MFAStrongStrongStrongOWASP calls it by far the best defense against most password attacks [3]
Account or smart lockoutStrongLimitedLimitedSpraying is built to avoid lockouts [1]
Password blocklistHelpsStrongHelpsNIST requires full-password blocklist checks [5]
Reset breached accountsLittleLittleStrongMITRE names proactive resets for stuffing [2]
CAPTCHA, rate limits, IP intelligenceHelpsLimitedLimitedEach has known workarounds [3]
Cross-account failure monitoringHelpsStrongHelpsMITRE's detection strategy spans many accounts [1]

Complexity rules are missing from that table on purpose. MITRE notes that spray passwords may match the complexity policy of the domain [1]. A rule that demands a symbol and a capital letter still allows the password everyone guesses first.

NIST's current password rules push defenders toward length and screening, not complexity. SP 800-63B-4 requires at least 15 characters when a password is the only factor, and at least eight when it is part of multi-factor authentication [5]. It says verifiers shall not impose other composition rules, and new passwords must be compared in full against a blocklist of common, expected or compromised values [5].

The same document requires rate limiting on failed attempts, with no more than 100 consecutive failures per account as an upper bound that agencies may lower [5]. It also says verifiers shall not require periodic password changes, but shall force a change if there is evidence of compromise [5].

OWASP adds that no single layer should carry the load, since CAPTCHAs can be broken, IP blocks are easy to get around, and client-side checks can be spoofed [3].

Here's the part that cuts against the "just add MFA" advice. NIST says passwords aren't phishing-resistant, and one-time codes typed in by the user aren't either [5].

MFA stops a guessed password from opening the door. A leaked password is still a leaked password.

What Should You Do First When You Spot One?

Start by finding out whether any guess worked. Group failed sign-ins by source and time window across all accounts, then look for a success from the same source after a run of failures. Reset and re-enroll MFA on any account that succeeded. Treat accounts found in known breaches as suspect even without a hit, then tighten the control that missed it.

  1. Group the failures. Count them by source and window across every account, not per account. That's the view MITRE's spray analytics assume [1].
  2. Hunt for the success. MITRE's analytics call out failures across many users from an external source followed by a success from the same IP address [2].
  3. Contain. Reset accounts known to be in breached credentials, either at once or after you see guessing attempts, and turn on MFA, including on externally facing services [2] [1].
  4. Warn the user. OWASP says a login with the correct password that then fails the MFA check should trigger a notice so the person changes the password [3].

What Are the Strategic Implications for Your Sign-In Defenses?

Judge your sign-in defenses by what they can see, not just what they block. Per-account counters see brute force. Cross-account views see spraying. Breach intelligence sees stuffing. A mature setup covers all three views at once, because a gap in any one of them is exactly where an attacker will choose to work.

In our view, the useful audit question is simple: for each of the three attacks, which log field would show it, and who reads that field? If nobody can answer for spraying, start there. Microsoft's default of 10 failures and NIST's ceiling of 100 are limits, not goals [4] [5].

Write down the owner of each view. Review that list whenever your identity provider or logging setup changes.

Then fix the cheap things. Screen new passwords against a blocklist, drop forced complexity and rotation, and require MFA on every externally reachable sign-in, including the management services MITRE lists as common targets, such as RDP, SSH and SMB [5] [1].

Sources & References

Sources checked on November 19, 2026.

  1. MITRE ATT&CK, "Brute Force: Password Spraying (T1110.003)"
  2. MITRE ATT&CK: "Brute Force: Credential Stuffing (T1110.004)" and "Brute Force: Password Guessing (T1110.001)"
  3. OWASP Cheat Sheet Series, "Credential Stuffing Prevention"
  4. Microsoft Learn, "Protect user accounts from attacks with Microsoft Entra smart lockout"
  5. NIST SP 800-63B-4, "Authenticator and Verifier Requirements"
NK

Cybersecurity Researcher & Technical Editor

UnpanicTech publishes independent cybersecurity research and defensive security analysis. Naseem Khan serves as Technical Editor, with a focus on vulnerability analysis, defensive security, incident response, cloud security, and practical security engineering.

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